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DYSFUNCTIONAL  NON-MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
AND THE MARKET 
ABSTRACT 
There  is a widespread belief  that when significant  market failure oc- 
curs, there are strong  incentives for non—market  institutions  to develop 
which go at least part of the way to  remedying the deficiency.  We  demon- 
strate that this functionalist position  is not in general valid.  In partic- 
ular, we examine a situation  where insurance is characterized  by  sorsi haz- 
ard.  We show  that when  market  insurance is provided,  supplementary  mutual 
assistance  between family  and friends (unobservable to market  insurers) - a 
form  of non—market  institution — will  occur and may be harmful.  This example 
suggests that non—market  institutions can arise spontaneously  even  though 
they are dysfunctional. 
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There  is a widespread  belief  that when  significant  market  failure  oc- 
curs,  there  are strong  incentives  for non—market  institutions  to develop 
which  go at least part of the way to remedying  the deficiency.  This  func- 
tionalist1  view is suppo  ted by Arrow 11965] who argues  not only that  when 
the market  fails  to  achieve  an  optimal  state,  society will,  to some  extent 
at least,  recognize  the gap, and non—market  institutions  will  arise attempt- 
ing to bridge  it  (p.  18),  but also that such institutions  will normally  be 
ameliorative.  We agree with the first part  of this position  — that market 
failure  will tend  to spawn  non—market  Institutions.  But it is our contention 
that there  is no a priori  presumption  that equilibria  with  voluntary  non— 
market  institutions  deal  better  with the problems  arising from  market  failure 
than the market  alone.  That  a non—market  institution  arises  to fill  some 
perceived  need does  not mean that it in  fact serves  that need. 
The Incongruence  between  intentions  and consequences  has been much  re- 
marked.  In a celebrated  statement,  Adam  Smith  [1937, p.  423]  argues  that 
individuals  pursuing  their own self—interest  may  promote  the social  good:2 
—— every individual  —— endeavours as much as he can to direct [his 
capital]  that  its produce may be of  the greatest value —— He generally 
intends  only  his own gain —— [but by labouring  to  render]  the annual 
revenue  of the society  as great  as he can -- is -— led by an invisible 
hand to promote  an  end which  was no part of his intention  —- to  promote 
the public  interest. 
The obverse  of this observation  is that harm may derive from  well—intentioned 
actions.3  Smith  goes on to argue  [1937, Bk.  IV,  Ch.  II] that, because  of 
forseen consequences,  most  government  regulation, however  benign  in intent, 
is either  useless  or hurtful.  In  a similar vein,  we  shall  argue  that In  the presence  of market  failure,  equilibrium  may be characterized  by spontaneous, 
non—market  institutions  which  are completely  dysfunctional;  by "spontane- 
ous', we mean  arising  from the decentralized  and uncoordinated  actions of 
atomistic  economic  agents;  and by "completely  dysfunctional',  having  the op- 
posite  effects  to those  intended. 
This  paper illustrates  this important principle  with  an example which is 
of interest  in  its own right.  The literature  over  the past fifteen  yeara  has 
directed  attention  to the ubiquity  of moral hazard  and incentive  problems. 
One of the ways the market  responds  to  moral  hazard  is to provide  incomplete 
insurance,  since with incomplete  insurance  individuals  still  have some  incen- 
tive to take  actions which reduce  the probability  of the insured—against 
event  occurring.  But  they must then  bear  more risk than  they  would like.  A 
principal  function  of mmny  non—market  institutions,  meanwhile,  is to help 
those who have suffered  some misfortune,  which  entails  the provision  of in- 
surance:  The marriage  vows  formalize  and sanctify  the mutual insurance  as- 
pects  of the family;  the acid  test of a friend  is his willingness  to help 
in  times  of  need;  charity  is regarded mm meritorious  and is subsidized  by 
the government;  and many  government  social  assistance  programs,  such as 
unemployment  insurance  and workmen's  compensation,  have m strong  insurance 
component.  The importance  of non—market  insurance  is illustrated  by what 
happens if an individual  catches pneumonia  as a result of going on m hiking 
trip  with inadequate  rain  gear:  His employer  gives  him compensated  sick 
lemve;  part or  all of his medical  expenses  are reimbursed  by his insurance 
policy  or the state;  uncovered  medical expenses  may be partially  deductible 
from  his income  tax;  and family  and friends  rally round  to provide  other 
forms  of support.  Such extensive  support, while  directly  helpful,  deleteri- 
ously  affects  individuals'  care to avoid  accidents.  In terms  of the example, 
2 had the  individual  borne  all the costs  of catching  pneumonia  himself,  he 
might  have  taken  the trouble to carry  adequate  rain  gear.  Thus,  it is not 
obvious  that  the Insurance  provided by non—market  institutions  is always 
beneficial,  or, more specifically,  whether  non—market  insurance  institutions, 
when they supplement  market  insurance,  Improve  the economy's  ability  to 
handle  the moral  hazard  tradeoff between  risk—bearing  and incentives. 
We address  this issue by  enquirlng  whether  the reciprocal  provision  of 
insurance  within  families  and between  friends,  which  we term non—market  in- 
surance4  is welfare—improving  when It supplements  market  Insurance.  We 
show  that  non-market  insurance will  always  be provided.  Such insurance  can, 
but need  not,  be  welfare—improving  If  the non—market  insurer  is better able 
to observe  the  insured'  s accident—prevention  activity  than  market  insurers. 
In the extreme  case,  where  the non-market  insurer has no more information 
than the market insurer,  the provision  of non—market  insurance  is unambigu- 
ously harmful;  non—market  insurers are  less efficient  providers  of insur- 
ance than the market  and the insurance  they  provide  crowds  out the market 
insurance.  Our analysis  therefore  indicates  that dysfunctional  non—market 
social institutions  can arise  spontaneously.  Relatedly,  in  designing  public 
insurance,  the government  should  consider  the interaction  between public  in- 
surance,  market  insurance,  and non—market  insurance. 
Our treatment  will  be Illustrative  rather than  exhaustive.  We shall 
assume  that:  I) the total quantity  of market  Insurance  purchased  by the in- 
sured is observable;  ii) an individual  can obtain  non—market  Insurance  to 
supplement  this  market  insurance  from  only  one source;  and lii) a market 
insurer  cannot  observe  the non—market  insurance  obtained  by a client  and 
cannot therefore  write insurance  contracts  contingent  on it.  We shall  con- 
sider  two cases;  in the first, the non—market  insurer  (like market  insurers) 
3 cannot  observe  the insured'  s level of  precaution,  while in the second  case 
he can. 
1.  The Basic  Model 
We first  describe  the canonical  moral  hazard  model  without  non—market 
Insurance  (Arnott and Stiglitz (l9SSa}.  There  is a single  accident;  the 
probability  of its occurrence,  p,  depends on the individual's  efforts  at 
accident  avoidance,  e.  The accident—avoIdance  function  is cc';ex: 
p  0,  p" a 0. 
The individual's  wealth  is  w,  and d is the damage  caused  by the accident. 
The individual  purchases  all his market  insurance from one insurance  firm in 
a competitive  insurance  market.5 The insurance  policy  pays a (the  (net) 
payout)  if the accident  occurs,  and the individual  pays the  insurance  firm  (3 
(the premium)  if it does not.  Then,  the individual's  consumption  if an 
accident  occurs  is 
(Ia) 
while  if no accident  occurs,  it is 
y0w-f3.  (ib) 





— e.  (2) 
with  u'  > 0,  u" < 0. 
When individuals  purchase  all their market  insurance  from a single  in- 
surer  and no non—market  insurance  is provided,  it is well—known  (Pauly 
[19741) that  the competitive  equilibrium  insurance  contract  will typically 
provide  only  partial  insurance  and will typically  ration  the amount  of insur- 
ance the insured individual  can buy at the equilibrium  price (the premium- 
4 payout  ratio, denoted  as  q).  This is depicted  in Figure  1.  The equilibrium 
contract  occurs at the point of maximum utility  (point  12  in  the Figure) on 
the insurance  firms zero profit  locus  (ZPL):  (l—p)3—ps  = 0.  The slope  of 
the zero profit  locus  is 
= 
p+(a+3)p' 
i;;;.  ZPL  (l-p)—(a+3)p 
while  that  of an indifference  curve  is 
u1p  =  > 0.  (4)  da  - 
V 
u3(l-p) 
Because of moral hazard,  as long as effort remains  positive,  the individual 
8e 
expends  less effort  as more insurance  is provided,  so that  < 0 and  < C, 
Since 12  is at a point  of tangency  of  the zero profit  locus and an indiffer- 
ence curve,  >  0  at 12.  And since  the numerator  of  (3)  is positive,  da ZPL 
d(3  d)3  the denominator  must be positive  at 12.  Hence, at 12, —  = —  > 
da  ZPL  da  i-p 
From (4),  the  latter  inequality  implies u1 
> 
u0 
- partial  insurance;  fur- 
thermore,  since  the slope  of  the  indifference curve  at 12  exceeds  the price of 
insurance  there 
(q12 
= {]Q' 
given by the slope  of the line joining  12 
and the origin)  the individual  would  like to purchase  additional  insurance at 
the equilibrium  price — rationing. 
We now consider  the simplest  possible extension  of this  model.  There 
are two symmetric  Individuals  (say husband  (H) and wife (W)) with  the same 
tastes  and accident—prevention  technololgies.  H and W agree  that  if one 
spouse  has an  accident,  while the other does not,  there will  be a transfer of 
resources  of & 
2.  Effort Unobservable  by the Non—Market  Insurer 
We shall start  by characterizing  equilibrium  for the case  where  an  in— 
5 dividual's  accident—avoidance  effort  is observable  by neither  his partner 
nor market  insurers.  Equilibrium  may entail a combination  of market  and 
non—market  insurance.  Subsequently,  we shall  investigate  the efficiency 
properties  of the equilibrium. 
There  are four events  — neither  the individual  nor his partner  has an 
accident,  the individual  has an accident but his partner  does  not,  etc.  Let 
e denote  the individual's  effort  and  his partner's.  Then the probability 
that  neither  the individual  nor his partner  has an accident  is 
(l—p(efl(l—p(&))  and the individual's  utility  in this event  is u(w—),  etc. 
Thus, an individual's  expected  utility  is 
EU = u(w—j3)(l—p(e))(l—p())  + u(w—d+a)p(e)p() 
+ u(w—f3—3)(l—p(e))p() + u(w—d+a+3)p(e)(1—p())  — e,  (5) 
whi.h  may  be written  more  succinctly  as 




— e,  (5') 
where 
u0 
e u(w-),  u1  u(w—d+a),  u2 
e u(w—f3-3),  and u3 
e u(w-d+a÷6),  and 
p s p(). 
We assume  that H and W are smart, and take into account how the other 
will adjust effort  in response  to a change  in 6.6  But both assume  that the 
market  contract  will be unaffected  by  their actions. 
In deciding  on  his own ievel of  effort,  given  a,  fi,  and  3,  the individ- 
ual treats  his partner's  effort as  fixed.  Thus,  the equation  characterizing 
his levei of precaution  (assumed strictly  positive)  is 
— 1  = 0,  (6) 
which  gives 
e = e(a,j3,6),  (Ta) 
and by symmetry 
= e(a,8,3).  (7b) 
6 The individual  and his partner  perceive  expected  utility  to be related  to 3 






.  (8) 
In so  doing,  they neglect  that,  since  other couples  too behave  in this way, 
insurance  companies  adjust  a and  In  response  to a change  In  5.  Combining 
(6),  (7a),  (7b), and (8),  and noting  that the equilibrium  is symmetric,  gives 
aEu  3e  = 
(—u2+u3)(l—p)p 
+  (1+(u—u3)p ) 
.  (9) 
Furthermore,  from  (6), 
3e  (u2P+u;(1_P))P'  = — 
p  2 
<  0,  (10) 
+ (p  )  (u0+u1-u2-u3) 
where the denominator  is negative  by the concavity  of  u. 
At  0,  the competitive  equilibrium  in  the absence of non—market  insur- 
ance, =0,  1+(u2—u3)p' 
= 0  (eq.  (6)),  and —u2+u3 
> 0  (incomplete  insurance), 
so that from (9) 
= (-u2+u3)(1-p)p 
> 0.  (11) 
Thus, at the competitive  equilibrium  in the absence of insurance,  the 
ners perceive  a mutual  insurance  pact to be beneficial  and would  therefore 
provide  one another with  non—market  insurance  to supplement  their market 
Insurance.  The intuition  for this  result  is as follows:  At 0,  the partners 
are rationed  in the amount of insurance  they  can purchase  at the price  q0. 
They  perceive  that by entering  Into  a mutual  insurance  pact,  they can acquire 
additional  insurance  at this price,  contingent  on one and only one of the 
partners  suffering  an accident.  More specifically,  at 0,  since  = 
pu3 
while  = -(l-p)u2, 
so that 
8EU  ÔE1J  8EU 
(l—p) — 
+  p  ,  (12) 
an  individual  regards  a unit  Increase  In  5 as equivalent  to a unit Increase in a with  probability  (i—p)  (the probability  that his partner  is  not  sick 
when he  is)  combined  with a unit increase  in  with  probability  p  (the proba- 
bility  his partner  is sick  when he is not);  or,  equivalently,  as an expected 
increase  of (l—p) in  the amount of insurance,  a,  obtained at the price 
(i.e., the  movement  from  B to 4'  in the Figure).  As already noted,  in  reason- 
ing in this  way,  individuals  neglect  that when everyone  enters  into such  a 
pact,  which  reduces  effort  (eq.  (10)) and increases  the probability  of acci- 
dent,  market  insurers  are forced to  offer  a less attractive  contract  in order 
to maintain  zero  proftts. 
H and W choose  '3  to  maximize  their  expected  utilities,  taking  a and  (3 
Ow  —  as given.  From  = 0,  e=e, and (6),  one obtains 3'3(aj3).  By observing 
how the probability  of accident  responds  to  changes  in a and  (3,  market  in- 
surers  will implicitly  take into account  that  '3  responds  to a and  (3 accord- 
ing to ,3=â(a,r3).  Competition,  meanwhile,  will continue  to  result  in the 
equilibrium  market contract  maximizing  expected  utility  subject  to zero prof- 
its.  Thus,  in  the presence  of  non—market  insurance,  the equilibrium  market 
contract  maximizes 
= u(w—)(1-p)2 + u(w—d+a)p2  + 
+ u(w—d+a+6)p(l—p)  — e  (13) 
s.t.  I)  (i—p) — up = 0 
ii)  e = 
where  ii) is obtained  by combining  (7a) and S='5(a,f3). 
Given the assumed  information  technology,  it can be shown  that the 
non-market  insurance  is unambiguously  harmful  and dysfunctional.  The line 
of proof is straightforward:  Welfare  is at least as high  if the market 
insurer  chooses a, , and  6  as  if he  chooses  just a and  fi,  with  6 being 




The individual perceives that he can 
obtain additional  insurance at  the 





Figure  1: and 6,  he will set 6=0. 
The equilibrium  without  non—market  insurance  cannot be improved  upon, 
and,  if it were  possible,  it would  be  desirable  to outlaw  the provision  of 
non—market  insurance.  The  intuitive  rationale  for  this result  is as  follows: 
The provision  of non—market  insurance  does  not enhance  the risk—sharing 
capabilities  of the economy.  Rather,  such insurance  crowds  out market 
insurance.  Not only is it less  effective  than  market  insurance  since  it 
randomizes  an individual's  event-contingent  consumption,  and is provided  by a 
risk—averse  agent  (see Marshall [l976]), but also the simultaneous  provision 
of market  and non—market  insurance  violates  exclusivity  (see Arnott  and 
Stiglitz [1986]). 
The government  may be able to  influence  the amount of non—market  insur- 
ance provided.  First,  in designing  its own insurance,  it should  take into 
account  the effect on  non—market  insurance;  second,  it can tax or regulate 
the assistance  provided  by  charitable  organizations,  where such  benevolence 
interferes  with the efficient  provision  of market  insurance;  and  third,  it 
can institute  a host of  second—best  policies  to influence  the amount  of non— 
market  insurance  provided,  such  as  the taxation  of  complements  to non—market 
insurance.  But in many  contexts,  such as  the mutual assistance  provided  by 
friends  and family  in times of  need,  the extent to  which  the government  can 
and should  intervene  is  circumscribed  by social custoa  and civil  libertarian 
concerns.  Furthermore,  no intervention  is warranted  if the costa  of inter- 
vention  exceed  the benefits. 
The above  analysis  was predicated  on  the asaumptions  that  a market  which 
provides insurance  against the accident  in question  exists  and that there  are 
no transactions  costs  associated  with  the provision  of insurance.  If market 
insurance  against  a given accident  does not in fact  exist, non—market  inaur— 
9 ance is unambiguously  beneficial.  And when  transactions  costs are taken into 
account,  non—market  insurance  may be  beneficial  if it is provided  at lower 
transaction  cost than market  insurance.  Taking  these considerations  into 
account,  our analysis  can be interpreted  in terms of the historical  evolution 
of insurance  institutions.  In traditional  societies,  non—market  institutions 
develop  to provide  insurance,  which  are unambiguously  beneficial  and func- 
tional.  As time  proceeds  and the economy becomes  more  developed,  the set of 
insurance  markets becomes  more complete  and the transactions  costs  associated 
with the markets  for insurance  fall.  Concomitantly,  the non—market  insurance 
institutions  remain, but are partially  displaced  by insurance  markets.  In 
the limit,  as the transactions  costs associated  with the provision  of insur- 
ance go to zero,  the non—market  institutions  remain  and are harmful;  they 
become  not only  vestigial,  but also dysfunctional. 
3.  Effort  Observable  by  the Non—Market  Insurer 
This case is more interesting  since  there appear  to be two offsetting 
effects.  On the one hand,  because  individuals  have information  on their 
partner's  effort,  which  an insurance  company does not, the provision  of non- 
market  insurance  has the potential  of  enhancing  the risk—sharing  capabili- 
ties of the economy.  On the other  hand,  the provision  of insurance  by a 
risk—neutral  agent  is typically more efficient  than  by a risk—averse  agent, 
if they  have  access  to the same information.  Furthermore,  the simultaneous 
provision  of market  and non—market  insurance, by violating  exclusivity,  typi- 
cally  creates uninternalized  externalities.  This line of reasoning  suggests 
that the provision  of non—market  insurance  in this case may be beneficial  in 
some circumstances  and harmful  in others. 
We continue  with the same  model.  When effort  is observable  within  the 
10 family  but not to the insurmnce  firm,  and when,  ms we have assumed,  individ- 
uals are identical,  family  members will effectively  choose  the level  of pre- 
cautIon  to take cooperatively.  Each  will  take a and  to be fixed, and 






— e.  (14) 
This  yields  the following  first—order  conditions: 
e: 
(—2(l—p)u0+2pu1+(l—Zp)(u2+u3))p' 
= 1  (l5a) 
5:  (-u2+u3)p(l-p) 
= 0.  (lsb) 
Eq.  (lSb) implies  that 
5 =  .  (l5b' 
Because  the partners  can observe each  other'  s effort  and treat a and  (3  aa 
fixed, they  perceive  there to be no moral hazard  problem  associated  with the 
insurance  they provide and hence provide  (as) full  insurance  (as possible). 
This  stands  in  contrast  to  the previous  section where, as a result  of the 
inability  of each  partner  to  observe  the other's  effort, only  partial  non— 
market  insurance  was provided  (see (9)). 
The insurance  firm effectively  chooses a and 3 to maximize expected 
lity, subject  to (15a),  (lSb) and the zero profit  constraint.  The 
competitive  equilibrium  with  non—mmrket  insurance  is characterized  by the 
constraints  and first—order  conditions  of this  program. 
We now investigate  the welfare  properties  of the equilibrium.  To do 
this, we assume  that the planner  chooses  a, ,  and  5,  knowing  that individ- 
uals choose  e according  to (iSa), which  takes account  of the fact  that S is 
chosen  with effort  observable,  and subject to the break—even  constraint  on 
market  insurance. 
11 Substituting  the zero profit  constraint  into  (14) gives 




+  u(w--)p(l-p) 
+ 
u[w_d 
÷  + 
J(i_) 
-  e.  (16) 






= 0.  (17) 
From (15a) 
de  (1—2p)(u3—u2) 
(18) 
where  = i_ (2pu1+(1—2p)u3) 
- 2p' (u0+u1-u2-u3) 
— 
p  (p) 
Substituting  (18) into  (17)  gives 
(u-u)(  8EU  3  2  I  p  = 
f3up  —2p p(l-p)(u0+u1-u2—u3) 
- —  p(1-p) 
.  (17') 
I,  (p) 
is unambiguously  negative,  as is the expression  in  curly  brackets,  and hence 
aEU 
,  d-a—t3  = 0  only when U3 
= 
U2, 
i.e.  when 5 = 
——-- 
.  Furthermore,  U3 
> 
U2 
for  <  and u3 
< 
u2 for ô  > ,  and  so  is the utility-maximizing  . 
Thus,  when  effort  is observable  by the non—market  insurer,  the equilibrIum  is 
constrained  efficient, 
The results of the two cases analyzed  above  lead  naturally  to the con- 
jecture  that in intermediate  situations  in which  non—market  insurers  observe 
their partners'  effort  imperfectly,  but better  than the market  insurer, a 
super-optimal  amount of non-market  insurance will  be provided  that may or may 
not be better  than  no non—market  insurance at all.  The analysis  could be ex- 
tended  to compare  the optimal  and equilibrium  number  of  members  in a non— 
market  insurance  group;  in a large group,  there  is greater  diversification 
of risk, but more imperfect  observability. 
In the above  analysis,  we took the observability  of one partner's  acci- 
dent—prevention  effort  by the other as  exogenous.  In fact,  however,  the de— 
12 gree of such observability  is a function of the indirect  monitoring  system 
— the  system whereby  one partner  observes  the other's  effort  — as  well as the 
incentive each partner has to observe  the other, which is determined  by the 
extent  of interdependence  — the  dependence  of one partner's  utility  on the 
other's  effort.  These  considerations  suggest a neglected  feature  of contract 
design.  A principal  with many  agents  can reduce  moral  hazard  either  by 
directly  monitoring  his agents  or by  setting up an indirect  monitoring  mystom 
with interdependence.  While the literature  has given  considerable  attention 
to direct  monitoring,  it has largely  ignored the design  of indirect  monitor- 
ing systems c interdependence.7 
4.  Conclusions 
Elsewhere  we have  argued  that aoral hazard  and incentive  problems  are 
pervasive,  not only in insurance  markets,  but in labor,  capital,  and product 
markets  as  well.  In  these  circumstances,  competitive  market  economies  are 
generally  not constrained  Pareto  efficient  —— there  are interventions  which 
respect  the costs  of information  (and other transactions  costs)  that are 
fare—enhancing  (Arnott and Stiglitz  [1986]). 
Within  economics,  there Is a long—standing  view that when there are such 
market  IneffIciencies,  individuals  will get together  to develop  institutional 
arrangements  that alleviate  these market  failures.8'9  In this paper, we have 
presented  a counter—example,  In our stark model,  though  the market response 
to imperfect  information  (the rationing  of Insurance)  did indeed  give  rise to 
a non—market  response,  whether  the non—market  response  was welfare—enhancing 
turned  out to depend  on whether  the non—market  Institution  was  informational— 
ly advantaged  relative  to the market  instItution.  More specifically,  if non— 
market  insurers were no better—informed  than the market,  then the non-market 
13 insurance  crowded  out the more efficient  market  insurance  and welfare  was un- 
ambiguously  lowered;  if,  however,  non—market  insurers were better—informed, 
the non—market  insurance  might  or  might not be beneficial. 
How the government  should  respond  to this type of non—market  failure 
depends  on context.  At the least,  government  should  take  into account  the 
response  of non—market  insurers  to the insurance which it provides.  More 
generally,  our paper  suggests  that non—market  institutions  may arise  spon- 
taneously  and persist,  even though they  are dysfunctional. 
10, 11 
The import- 
ance  and scope  of this possibility,  as  well as the appropriate  policy  re- 
sponse  to such  non—market  failure,  merits  considerable  further  investigation. 
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In anthropology  there  is  a functionalist  tradition  of long  standing 
which  attempts  to explain social  institutions  (political,  economic, 
sociological,  cultural,  and psychological)  as functional  adaptations  to 
a society's  environment  or ecosystem.  Functionalist  theories  differ  in 
their degree  of subtlety  and sophistication  and in  their  emphasis,  but 
none seem to make a sharp distinction  between  equilibrium  and optimum. 
In most theories,  however,  there  seems  to be a presumption  that 
institutional  adaptation  to the environment  is  efficient.  See Keesing 
[1981] for an informative  discussion  of contemporary  traditions  in 
anthropology. 
2.  This conjecture,  appropriately  formalized  — the  Fundamental  Theorem  as— 
sertthg  the Pareto  efficiency  of market  economies  — is the central  re- 
sult in the Old  Welfare  Economics. 
3.  Smith tl937, p. 423]:  'By  pursuing  his own interest  [the individual] 
frequently  promotes  that of  society more effectually  than  when  he really 
intends  to promote  it'. 
4.  The term  "social  insurance'  is perhaps  more  appropriate,  but  is used in 
some  countries  to  refer  to  social  security.  The term  "informal 
insurance  is  appropriate  for the example, but the phenomenon  we 
identify  arises  in  formal, non—market  institutions  as well. 
5.  See Arnott  and Stiglitz  [l988b] for a discussion  of  the rationale  for 
this  exclusivity  provision. 
6.  We would  obtain  the same qualitative  results  if we assumed  Instead  that 
H and W Ignore  that the other  will adjust effort  in response  to a change 
In & 
7.  One exception  is Carmichael  [1988].  He  considers  peer  review  in the 
university  setting, which is a form  of indirect  monitoring  system,  and 
argues that the institution of tenure  is needed  to make  peer review 
incentive—compatible. 
8,  In our example,  the market  by itself  is constrained  Pareto  efficient. 
However,  there is  terceived  market  failure,  and the non—market 
institution  (the provision  of supplementary  non—market  insurance)  arises 
In response  to this  perceived  market  failure. 
In an expanded  version  of our  model in  which there are many  kinds 
of accidents  and many commodities,  the market  is  not constrained  Pareto 
efficient;  there  Is  genuine potential  market  failure  (Arnott and 
Stiglitz [1986]).  Our result  concerning  the possible  dysfunctionality 
of spontaneous  non—market  institutions  carries over to this  more 
realistic  setting. 
15 9.  The conjecture  that  the resulting  equilibria  are efficient  is often 
attributed  to Coase [1960].  He seems, however,  to have  been more con- 
cerned  with  small  group  externalities  than  with  more  generalized 
atmospheric'  externalities. 
10.  In one sense, this  result  should  come  as no surprise,  since  it is by now 
well—recognized  that, even in  large  economies,  Nash equilibria  are 
Pareto  efficient  only  under  special  circumstances.  One of the great 
achievements  of modern  economics  was to identify a special  set of 
assumptions  under which  competitive  economies  are Pareto  efficient. 
11.  Akerlof  [1980] has argued that inefficient  social customs  may persist  as 
Nash equilibria,  and that there  can be an arbitrarily  large set of 
social customs  sustainable  as Nash equilibria. 
The point  in  our paper  is  related but different.  Akerlof  considers 
the possible  persistence  of inefficient  institutions,  but does  not in- 
vestigate  how the institutions  came into being.  We show  not only that 
an inefficient  institution  can persist, but also that it can arise 
spontaneously.  Furthermore,  while  in  the Akerlof  model, there  are 
multiple  equilibria  of which  some  may be  efficient,  in our model  there 
is a unique  equilibrium. 
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